The TitANiC sinking?

The ANC campaign machinery is creaking.

Legend has it that in 1488, Bartolomeu Dias rounded the Cape in weather so cruel he named it Cabo das Tormentas, the "Cape of Storms". On his return to Lisbon, he told King João II about the voyage.

Afraid that sailors wouldn't dare round a Cape so dangerous, João II decided to rename it Cabo da Bõa Esperença, the "Cape of Good Hope". However, if João II had a front-row seat, five centuries later, to the politics of that vast land that lies beyond the majestic cliffs, he would certainly have agreed with Dias.

Next year, South Africa experiences its fourth democratic general election. Given the storm clouds gathering over the political landscape, examining the state of electoral readiness of the political parties is crucial. A proper assessment, however, requires a comparative examination with previous elections.

Since 1994, South Africa's proportional-representation electoral politics have been characterised by the increasing dominance of one party, the African National Congress, whose share of the vote has steadily increased: from 62,65 percent in 1994, to 66,35 percent in 1999, to 69,68 percent in 2004.

While many commentators have argued about the extent to which these successive majorities pose a threat to the sustainability of the new democratic system, very few have looked at the problem of lacklustre performance and inefficiency in the ranks of opposition parties, and their inability to mould an alternative to the ANC.

Nonetheless, a useful place to start is to examine the politics of the 2004 general election, and what this can tell us about the upcoming one.

The ANC entered the 2004 general election campaign under pressure: there were increasing tensions in the tripartite alliance, largely around the government's macroeconomic policies; it was facing charges of failings in the delivery of housing, water, electricity, welfare and healthcare; and, more importantly, there was intense internal conflict in the party hierarchy between factions lined up behind one or the other of Jacob Zuma, who was accused of accepting a bribe, and Bulelani Ngcuka, who was accused of being an apartheid-era spy. How the ANC managed these tensions politically was remarkable.

Firstly, the party's internal political fight was referred to the Hefer Commission, which moved the battle away from the rank-and-file. It consequently had no impact on the list process and, as a result, the nomination process went very smoothly, the only dispute being whether those who topped the provincial lists would be nominated for premiership.

Secondly, through the ANC's electoral campaign head and Thabo Mbeki confidant, Manne Dipico, the ANC revolutionised its campaign strategy. This happened in two significant ways. The first involved the repackaging of Mbeki as the campaign leader. Mbeki often came across as an aloof, pipe-smoking intellectual leader who had a love for the classics and English poetry.

The transformation of this image involved building on the success of the presidential imbizos and carefully orchestrating a door-to-door campaign that reached all corners of South Africa's diverse population: from rural to urban, black and white, to representatives of Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Tamil communities.

This image of the "new Mbeki" was one of a caring and responsive "man of the people", firmly in touch with the socio-political and economic realities of South African society.

The second involved combining this populist appeal with intellectual content. The electoral manifesto was the key: entitled the "People's contract to create work and fight poverty", it highlighted the government's social and economic achievements, but also had the honesty of identifying the major limitations.

This strategy worked. With opposition parties politically disorientated and weakened considerably in the post-floor-crossing period, they stood no chance: the ANC won by a landslide, falling just short of 70 percent.

Significantly, while it didn't win absolute majorities in the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, where it had strong competitors, it won plurality. Indeed, the ANC was on the verge of creating the competitive dominant party. But that was 2004.

On the eve of the 2009 general election, the political picture is very different. The once well-oiled, sleek and highly efficient electoral political party is now a house divided.

In the run-up to, and period after the Polokwane conference, the intra-party battles that have torn the organisation between supporters of Mbeki and those of Zuma are the definitive feature of the electoral campaign preparation period.

The provincial conferences, preparatory forums for the regional electoral campaigns, all follow a similar pattern: a member produces a knife or a firearm, a scuffle ensues, followed by a stampede. Police are called in to provide some semblance of order. Subsequently, at least one person is left seriously injured and hospitalised, and arrests are made.

The ANC's electoral readiness is characterised by a destructive trail of thuggery, deceit and corruption: it is widely reported that membership records have been falsified, and those who are on the wrong side of a faction are shut out and removed from strategic meetings by police.

The electoral campaign is in essence an intra-party zero-sum struggle for access to state resources: the control of municipalities and provinces; to appear on the list for deployment as public representatives and state officials; and to be in the patronage chain of tenders and procurement.

Externally, it hinges on two interrelated issues: the campaign to prevent Zuma from standing trial for corruption and the dissolution of the Scorpions, that is, the crime-busting unit responsible for his woes.

This image stands in direct contrast to the ANC on the eve of the 2004 general election. The current image is one of a party wearing out its political legitimacy, one that is losing its vigour and internal cohesion, with its arteries hardening. The Mbeki-Zuma feud, and its resolution in the Polokwane conference, bears the seeds of the party's destruction.

As for the opposition, the question remains how, or to what extent, this section of the political class can capitalise on a self-destructing ANC.

For the future viability of South Africa's democracy, and accompanying alternation of political representatives, does not only depend on the ANC, but rather on the ability of the society to produce alternative political means of consolidating democracy and social peace.

While civil society may generate the momentum, political opposition is the arena that involves the realisation of this ideal. That the opposition is seen as not a credible or viable alternative, lacking administrative capacity, with cynical voting patterns of voters withholding their vote rather than finding a new political home, is one of the biggest structural weaknesses facing the democratic system.

Thus, the fractured, self-destructing, gun-toting ANC can breathe a sigh of relief. Regardless of how the Mbeki-Zuma feud pans out, the party will do as it pleases. Like the storm that threatened to blow Dias's ship to smithereens, South Africans will have no other option but to endure the coming Zunami.