Shift in South Africa's foreign policy?

From The Daily Dispatch

Zuma’s arrival brings to an end Mbeki’s foreign policy excesses.

Although a democratic country’s basic foreign policy usually does not change much from one administration to another (because of the bi-partisan nature of national interests), shifts in style and emphasis are quite common. This will probably also be the case under Jacob Zuma’s presidency.

Judging from low saliency of foreign policy issues during the recent election campaign – Zuma hardly mentioned the subject – it could reasonably be expected that foreign-policy making will shift back from the Presidency to the Department of International Relations . Zuma will decide only on high policy matters, leaving the rest to the department, as was the case during Nelson Mandela’s presidency before Thabo Mbeki took over.

Under Zuma, domestic issues will dominate, hopefully bringing a sensible – albeit belated – change of emphasis. The fact that he appointed the almost unknown Maite Nkoana-Mashabane as Minister of International Relations seems to signal the end of Mbeki’s foreign policy excesses and dominance.

Taking stock of the Mbeki foreign policy legacy, it is obvious that South Africa overstretched and overreached in this regard, achieved only meagre results, particularly when measured against what the country’s core national interests prescribe. The well known dictum that “foreign policy starts at home” never seemed to rub off on Mbeki. Instead of exploiting the very favourable international environment for the betterment of the lives of the poor and unemployed masses, he set his sights on the bigger picture in his quest to become Africa’s überdiplomat and a world statesman.

Under his stewardship, South Africa’s foreign policy metamorphosed into a kind of supermarket – lots of action, global and regional in reach, complex agendas, a bit of everything, but no real thrust and achievement, no cutting edge, no lasting legacy. It left everybody outside the government – including foreign states – in some confusion: not knowing exactly what SA wanted, what its principles were, where exactly it was headed, and what to expect.

South Africa’s diplomacy became obsessed and pre-occupied with blue sky stuff, such as the country’s role in esoteric configurations like north-south, south- south, the Group of 24 countries, reform of the United Nations (UN), and so on and so forth. “SA speaks for Africa”, “SA speaks for the south” or “SA speaks for the underdeveloped world”, they proclaimed with a sense of pride and achievement.

Of course, success both at home and abroad would have assured Mbeki’s legacy – and saved his presidency – but the opportunity was missed in both areas. While he regularly shone at the meetings of the Group of Eight (G-8) countries, at the Economic Forum in Davos and umpteen conferences on global issues, he dismissed the golden opportunity to be South Africa’s super salesman.

Instead of the country becoming a winning nation – as so many well-wishers looked forward to – it slid into steady decline. The HIV/Aids pandemic devoured the country; rampant crime blighted the lives of law-abiding citizens; incompetence, corruption and looting the wealth of the nation became routinely associated with the government; from a food exporter South Africa declined into a food importer. The country was flooded by illegal immigrants from Zimbabwe and other Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries; highly skilled people left in droves; electric power failures became a daily routine crippling the economy; while poverty and unemployment remained at staggering heights, blighting our future stability. On the international front, Mbeki failed, or refused to foresee early on, the disastrous consequences of Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe’s crazy policies for South Africa and the entire SADC region. The moral authority, the democratic transformation and the Madiba legacy the elder statesman left the country with were squandered, and superseded by an obsession with ideology. At the United Nations, South Africa willy-nilly sided with the anti- West; Mugabe – a struggle comrade – was rendered untouchable. Gross human rights abuses in Africa and elsewhere were given the blind eye; ideological expediency became the lodestar of South Africa’s foreign policy as the country cuddled up to the likes of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Ahmedinejad’s Iran, Hugo Chavez’s Venezuela and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea. In Africa, his (Mbeki’s) native turf, his clout as leader of sub-Sahara’s strongest state, in spite of all his efforts, became increasingly feeble, if not inconsequential. With the notable exception of his role in the creation of the African Union (to replace the dysfunctional Organisation of African Unity) and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (although the jury is still out on this one), his legacy is mostly one of unfinished business.

He overestimated his clout and place in the international pecking order, creating unrealistic expectations. He was never in the same league as Mandela. He simply lacked the grit and the gravitas to shift the boundaries of international politics. The message from Polokwane is clear: South Africa needs a foreign policy that speaks for the country and its people; our foreign policy starts at home, enhancing the nation’s welfare and security above anything else. In a nutshell, the way we engage the rest of the world should principally be related to our domestic needs and priorities.

The creation of welfare and prosperity at home should be the overbearing objective: job-creation, poverty reduction, combating underdevelopment, cannot be achieved without engaging the outside world and proving that we are a reliable, predictable partner.

As far as our general foreign policy is concerned, decision-makers in the post- Mbeki era should look for consolidation, rationalisation, prioritisation and dependability as an international role player. The quality and impact of South Africa’s foreign policy should be heightened, with more cutting edge elements maximising our intrinsic national interests.

Of paramount importance is, first, our southern African foreign policy, being the first circle of SA’s foreign policy and immediate sphere of influence. As regional primus inter pares we need to recapture the respect of our neighbouring partners, using it as a stepping stone towards the rehabilitation and development of sub-Saharan Africa.

Economic diplomacy should replace Mbeki’s obsessive, politically driven ideology. Instead of stuffing our embassies with political generalists, as is currently the case, we should introduce a new breed of economically-literate diplomats.

Multilateral diplomacy should remain (as is the case) a priority, but sans the debilitating ideological slant it acquired under Mbeki.

Professor Gerrit Olivier is Director of the Centre for African and European Studies at the University of Johannesburg and a former SA ambassador.